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Operational Earthquake Forecasting: Some 
Thoughts on Why and How
Suppose seismologists studying faults near an urbanized area 
could state with empirical reliability that a major earthquake 
is 100 to 1,000 times more likely to occur in the upcoming 
week than during a typical seven-day period. What actions, if 
any, should be taken for civil protection? 
Should the forecast be publicly broad-
cast? How should the public be advised 
to use such information? These quanda-
ries deserve thoughtful consideration, 
because we have entered the era of opera-
tional earthquake forecasting.
The goal of operational earthquake 
forecasting is to provide the public with 
authoritative information on the time 
dependence of regional seismic hazards. We know that seismic 
hazards change dynamically in time, because earthquakes sud-
denly alter the conditions within the fault system that will lead 
to future earthquakes. Statistical and physical models of earth-
quake interactions have begun to capture many features of nat-
ural seismicity, such as aftershock triggering and the clustering 
of seismic sequences. These short-term models demonstrate a 
probability gain in forecasting future earthquakes relative to 
the long-term, time-independent models typically used in seis-
mic hazard analysis. Data other than seismicity have been con-
sidered in earthquake forecasting (e.g., geodetic measurements 
and geoelectrical signals), but so far, studies of nonseismic pre-
cursors have not quantified short-term probability gain, and 
they therefore cannot be incorporated into operational fore-
casting methodologies. Accordingly, our focus in this article 
will be on seismicity-based methods that are enabled by high-
performance seismic networks.
An example of a seismicity-based operational system is 
the short-term earthquake probability (STEP) model, an after-
shock forecasting Web service provided for California by the 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) since 2005.1 STEP uses after-
shock statistics to make hourly revisions of the probabilities of 
strong ground motions (Modified Mercalli Intensity ≥ VI) on 
a 10-km, statewide grid. The nominal probability gain factors 
1. STEP (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/step) was developed 
by the USGS in partnership with Southern California Earthquake 
Center and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Gerstenberger 
et al. 2007). 
in regions close to the epicenters of small-magnitude (M 3–4) 
events are often 10–100 relative to the long-term base model. 
At the time of this writing, aftershocks near the central Baja 
California border of the 4 April 2010 El Mayor–Cucapah earth-
quake (M 7.2) have increased the probability on the U.S. side of 
the border by almost three orders of magnitude. STEP is a pro-
totype system that needs to be improved. For example, the prob-
ability change calculated to result from a 
particular earthquake does not depend 
on the proximity of that earthquake 
to major faults. The USGS, Southern 
California Earthquake Center (SCEC), 
and California Geological Survey (CGS) 
have set up a new Working Group on 
California Earthquake Probabilities 
to incorporate short-term forecasting 
into the next version of the fault-based 
Uniform California Earthquake Rupture 
Forecast (UCERF3), which is due to be submitted to the 
California Earthquake Authority in mid-2012.
The need to move quickly toward operational earth-
quake forecasting was underscored by the L’Aquila earthquake 
disaster of 6 April 2009, which killed about 300 people and 
destroyed or rendered uninhabitable approximately 20,000 
buildings. Seismic activity in the L’Aquila area increased in 
January 2009. A number of small earthquakes were widely 
felt and prompted school evacuations and other prepared-
ness measures. The situation was complicated by a series of 
earthquake predictions issued by Mr. G. Giuliani, a techni-
cian working at the Laboratori Nazionali del Gran Sasso and 
a resident of L’Aquila. These predictions, which were based 
on radon concentration in the air measured with gamma-ray 
detectors and analyzed using unpublished techniques, had no 
official auspices. At least two of Mr. Giuliani’s specific predic-
tions were false alarms; however, they generated widespread 
public concern and official reactions. Representatives of the 
Dipartimento della Protezione Civile (DPC) and Istituto 
Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV) responded 
with statements that 1)  there were no scientifically validated 
methods for earthquake prediction, 2) such swarm activity was 
common in this part of Italy, and 3) the probability of substan-
tially larger earthquakes remained small. The Commissione 
Nazionale per la Previsione e la Prevenzione dei Grandi Rischi, 
convened by the DPC on 31 March, concluded that “there is no 
reason to say that the sequence of events of low magnitude can 
be considered precursory to a strong event.” 
Opinion
O P I N I O N
The goal of operational 
earthquake forecasting is 
to provide the public with 
authoritative information 
on the time dependence of 
regional seismic hazards.
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In this situation, few seismologists would be comfortable 
with a categorical forecast of no increase in the seismic haz-
ard, which is the way many interpreted the DPC and INGV 
statements. It is true that foreshocks cannot be discriminated 
a priori from background seismicity. Worldwide, less than 10 
percent of earthquakes are followed by something larger within 
10 kilometers and three days; less than half of the large earth-
quakes have such foreshocks. In Italy, seismic swarms that do 
not include large earthquakes are much more common than 
those that turn out to be foreshocks. Nevertheless, owing to 
the statistics of clustering, most seismologists would agree that 
the short-term probability of a large earthquake in the L’Aquila 
region was higher in the weeks before the 2009 mainshock than 
in a typical, quiescent week. A forecast consistent with this seis-
mological understanding was not communicated to the public, 
and the need for a better narrative was consequently filled by 
amateur predictions rather than authoritative information. 
The DPC is now revising its operational forecasting pro-
cedures according to the findings and recommendations of an 
International Commission on Earthquake Forecasting (ICEF), 
which was convened by the Italian government and chaired by 
one of us (Jordan et al. 2009). The ICEF has recommended 
that the DPC deploy the infrastructure and expertise needed 
to utilize probabilistic information for operational purposes, 
and it has offered guidelines for the implementation of opera-
tional forecasting systems.
The case for the public dissemination of short-term, author-
itative forecasts is bolstered by the experience accumulated over 
the last two decades by the California Earthquake Prediction 
Evaluation Council (CEPEC), on which we both serve. In 
March 2009, just a few weeks before the L’Aquila earthquake, a 
swarm of more than 50 small earthquakes occurred within a few 
kilometers of the southern end of the San Andreas fault (SAF), 
near Bombay Beach, California, including an M 4.8 event on 
24 March. The hypocenters and focal mechanisms of the swarm 
were aligned with the left-lateral Extra fault, which experienced 
small surface offsets west of the Salton Sea during the 1987 
Superstition Hills earthquake sequence. However, the 24 March 
event was the largest earthquake located within 10 km of the 
southern half of the SAF’s Coachella segment since instrumen-
tal recording began in 1932. According to the UCERF2 time-
dependent model, the 30-year probability of an M  ≥  7 earth-
quake on the Coachella segment—which has not ruptured since 
circa 1680—is fairly high, about 24%, corresponding to a prob-
ability rate of 2.5 × 10–5 per day (Field et al. 2009).
CEPEC met by teleconference three and a half hours after 
the M 4.8 event at the request of the California Emergency 
Management Agency (CalEMA)—the new agency that had 
recently replaced the state’s Office of Emergency Services 
(OES)—and issued the following statement: “CEPEC 
believes that stresses associated with this earthquake swarm 
may increase the probability of a major earthquake on the 
San Andreas Fault to values between 1 to 5 percent over the 
next several days. This is based on methodology developed for 
assessing foreshocks on the San Andreas Fault.2 This potential 
will rapidly diminish over this time period.” The short-term 
probability estimated by CEPEC corresponded to a gain factor 
of about 100–500 relative to UCERF2. 
In issuing this operational forecast, CEPEC adhered to a 
notification protocol developed by the Southern San Andreas 
Working Group (1991). This protocol categorizes alerts for 
major earthquakes (M ≥ 7) at four levels of three-day probabil-
ity: D (0.1–1%), C (1–5%), B (5–25%), and A (> 25%). Level D 
alerts occur in most years and have not prompted any action by 
CEPEC or OES. The 2009 Bombay Beach event initiated a Level 
C alert. Other relevant examples come from four earlier periods 
of increased seismicity near the southern San Andreas fault:
• 23 April 1992 M 6.1 Joshua Tree earthquake. The epicen-
ter of this earthquake was only 8 km from the SAF. An 
M 4.6 foreshock about two-and-a-half hours before the 
mainshock initiated a Level C alert. About two hours 
after the mainshock, the OES, on advice from the USGS, 
officially stated that the probability of a major earthquake 
was 5–25%, raising the alert to Level B, and recommended 
that local jurisdictions take appropriate response.
• 28 June 1992 M 7.3 Landers earthquake. The epicenter 
and rupture zone was located away from the SAF, but 
aftershocks extended into the SAF zone in two locations. 
At a CEPEC meeting 36 hours after the earthquake, it was 
decided to establish a protocol informally called the “go-
to-war scenario.” If certain earthquakes were to occur, such 
as an M ≥ 6.0 within 3 km of the Coachella or Carrizo 
segments of the southern San Andreas, the USGS would 
notify OES within 20 minutes, and OES would act assum-
ing a 1-in-4 chance of a major San Andreas earthquake—
essentially a Level A alert. The governor taped a video mes-
sage to the state and plans were in place for deployment of 
the National Guard. This augmented protocol remained 
in effect for five years but was never invoked.
• 13 November 2001 Bombay Beach swarm, Mmax 4.1. 
This swarm began with an M 2.4 event just before 6 a.m., 
continued with several M 3+ events between 8 a.m. and 
9 a.m., and had its largest event, M 4.1, at 12:43 p.m. 
CEPEC met by conference call at 9:30 am and again at 
11:00 a.m. the same day. OES finally issued a statement 
about an increased risk of a San Andreas earthquake about 
2 p.m. The public scarcely noticed this Level C alert, and 
there was little media interest in the situation.
• 30 September 2004, M 5.9 Parkfield earthquake. Under 
the Parkfield protocol (Bakun et al. 1987) (from which 
the southern San Andreas protocol had been derived), the 
USGS stated that the probability of an 1857-type earth-
quake was about 10%, implying a Level B alert. However, 
CEPEC was not convened, and no direct action was taken 
by OES based on this alert.
This brief history demonstrates that operational earthquake 
forecasting is already being practiced in California, and the dis-
semination of forecasting products is becoming more automated. 
2. The CEPEC methodology was based on the formulation by Agnew 
and Jones (1991). For a recent review, see Michael (2010).
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For every earthquake recorded above M 5.0, the California 
Integrated Seismic Network, a component of the USGS 
Advanced National Seismic System, now automatically posts 
the probability of an M ≥ 5 aftershock and the number of M ≥ 3 
aftershocks expected in the next week. Authoritative short-term 
forecasts are becoming more widely used in other regions as well. 
For instance, beginning on the morning of 7 April 2009, the day 
after the L’Aquila mainshock, INGV began to post 24-hour fore-
casts of aftershock activity in that region of Italy. 
The California experience also indicates that operational 
forecasting will typically be done in a “low-probability envi-
ronment.” Earthquake probabilities derived from current seis-
micity models can vary over several orders of magnitude, but 
their absolute values usually remain low. Since the adoption 
of the southern San Andreas protocol nearly 20 years ago, the 
Level A probability threshold of 25% has 
never been reached, and the Level B thresh-
old of 5% has been exceeded only twice 
(after the Joshua Tree and Parkfield events). 
Thus, reliable and skillful earthquake 
prediction—i.e., casting high-probability 
space-time-magnitude alarms with low 
false-alarm and failure-to-predict rates—is 
still not possible (and may never be).
In this age of nearly instant informa-
tion and high-bandwidth communication, 
public expectations regarding the avail-
ability of authoritative short-term forecasts 
appear to be evolving rather rapidly. The 
2001 Bombay Beach swarm provoked concern at the state 
level but received little play in the public media. By 2009, the 
media and many individuals had become accustomed to track-
ing earthquakes on the Web, and seismological organizations 
received hundreds of inquiries from the public within hours of 
the 24 March event.
Information vacuums invite informal predictions and mis-
information. Prediction rumors are often spawned in the wake 
of a large earthquake in southern California. These rumors usu-
ally say that seismologists know that another large earthquake 
will happen within a few days, but they are not broadcasting 
this knowledge to avoid a panic. After the Landers earthquake 
in 1992, this rumor continued to grow over several weeks. 
Similar rumors after the 2010 El Mayor–Cucapah earthquake 
developed much more quickly with hundreds of messages pass-
ing through Twitter in just a few hours. These rumors pose a 
particular challenge for seismologists because they posit that 
we will deny the truth; to many people, an official denial sug-
gests a confirmation. The best defense against such tautology is 
to demonstrate that the scientific information is always avail-
able through an open and transparent forecasting process.
The appropriate choices at this juncture seem fairly obvi-
ous. The public needs an open source of authoritative, scien-
tific information about the short-term probabilities of future 
earthquakes, and this source needs to properly convey the 
epistemic uncertainties in these forecasts. In the past, CEPEC 
and its federal equivalent, the National Earthquake Prediction 
Evaluation Council (rechartered by the USGS in 2006 after 
a decade-long hiatus) have fulfilled these public requirements 
to a point, but the procedures display several deficiencies. The 
alerts have generally relied on generic short-term earthquake 
probabilities or ad hoc estimates calculated informally, rather 
than probabilities based on operationally qualified, regularly 
updated seismicity forecasting systems. The procedures are 
unwieldy, requiring the scheduling of meetings or teleconfer-
ences, which lead to delayed and inconsistent alert actions. 
Finally, how the alerts are used is quite variable, depending on 
decisions at different levels of government and among the pub-
lic. For example, the 2001 Bombay Beach M 4.1 earthquake led 
to a formal advisory from the state but the 2009 Bombay Beach 
M 4.8 earthquake, which was even closer to the San Andreas 
fault, did not.
In the future, the earthquake fore-
casting procedures should be qualified for 
usage by the responsible agencies according 
to three standards for “operational fitness” 
commonly applied in weather forecasting: 
they should display quality, a good cor-
respondence between the forecasts and 
actual earthquake behavior; consistency, 
compatibility among procedures used at 
different spatial or temporal scales; and 
value, realizable benefits (relative to costs 
incurred) by individuals or organizations 
who use the forecasts to guide their choices 
among alternative courses of action.3 All operational proce-
dures should be rigorously reviewed by experts in the creation, 
delivery, and utility of forecasts, and they should be formally 
approved by CEPEC and NEPEC, as appropriate. 
Operational forecasts should incorporate the results of 
validated short-term seismicity models that are consistent with 
the authoritative long-term forecasts. As recommended by the 
ICEF, the quality of all operational models should be evalu-
ated for reliability and skill by retrospective testing, and the 
models should be under continuous prospective testing against 
established long-term forecasts and a wide variety of alterna-
tive, time-dependent models. The Collaboratory for the Study 
of Earthquake Predictability (CSEP) has begun to establish 
standards and an international infrastructure for the compara-
tive, prospective testing of short- and medium-term forecasting 
models. Regional experiments are now underway in California, 
New Zealand, Japan, and Italy, and will soon be started in 
China; a program for global testing has also been initiated. 
Continuous testing in a variety of tectonic environments will 
be critical in demonstrating the reliability and skill of the oper-
ational forecasts and quantifying their uncertainties. At pres-
ent, seismicity-based forecasts can display order-of-magnitude 
differences in probability gain, depending on the methodology, 
and there remain substantial issues about how to assimilate the 
data from ongoing seismic sequences into the models.
3. Our criteria for operation fitness correspond to the “goodness” norms 
described by Murphy (1993).
The public needs 
an open source of 
authoritative, scientific 
information about the 
short-term probabilities 
of future earthquakes, 
and this source needs 
to properly convey the 
epistemic uncertainties 
in these forecasts. 
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Earthquake forecasts possess no intrinsic value; rather, 
they acquire value through their ability to influence decisions 
made by users. A critical issue is whether decision-makers can 
derive significant value from short-term forecasts if their prob-
ability gain relative to long-term forecasts is 
high, but the absolute probability remains 
low. In the late 1980s, when many scientists 
were still optimistic about the prospects for 
earthquake prediction, both the City of 
Los Angeles and the State of California 
developed plans to respond to the issuance 
of high-probability, short-term predic-
tions (as did NEPEC on a national scale). 
Much less work has been done on the ben-
efits and costs of mitigation and prepared-
ness actions in a low-probability environment. Forecast value 
is usually measured in terms of economic benefits or in terms 
of lives saved, but assessments of value are difficult because the 
measures must take into account the information available to 
decision-makers in the absence of the forecasts. 
Moreover, most value measures do not fully represent 
less tangible aspects of value-of-information, such as gains in 
psychological preparedness and resilience. The public’s fear of 
earthquakes is often disproportionate to the risk earthquakes 
pose to life safety. Psychological studies of post-traumatic 
stress disorder have shown that the symptoms are increased 
by a lack of predictability to the trauma. Authoritative state-
ments of increased risk, even when the absolute probability is 
low, provide a psychological benefit to the public in terms of 
an increased perception of regularity and control. The regular 
issuance of such statements also conditions the public to be 
more aware of ongoing risk and to learn how to make appropri-
ate decisions based on the available information.
The agencies with statutory responsibilities for operational 
forecasting are uncertain about their audience and their mes-
sage, and they have been cautious in developing new operational 
capabilities. But that may soon change. The USGS has proposed 
to establish a prototype operational earthquake forecasting 
activity in southern California in fiscal year 2011. If approved 
by Congress, the USGS will develop a formal process for issu-
ing forecasts in response to seismic activity. This activity will 
include forecast research and development, testing, validation, 
and application assessments. Research will consider earthquake 
shaking as well as earthquake occurrence. The coupling of phys-
ics-based ground motion models, such as SCEC’s CyberShake 
simulation platform, with earthquake forecasting models 
offers new possibilities for developing ground motion forecasts. 
Scientists from the USGS and academic organizations will 
work with the user community and communication specialists 
to determine the value of the forecasting and alert procedures, 
and a vigorous program of public education on the utility and 
limitations of low-probability forecasting will be conducted. 
We close with an important perspective: Although we 
are still learning what value can be derived from short-term 
forecasts, the value of long-term forecasts for ensuring seismic 
safety is indisputable. This was tragically illustrated by the 
MW 7.0 Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010, which currently 
ranks as the fifth-deadliest seismic disaster in recorded his-
tory. Though events of this magnitude were anticipated from 
regional geodetic measurements, build-
ings in the Port-au-Prince region were 
not designed to withstand intense seismic 
shaking. The mainshock struck without 
warning; no foreshocks or other short-term 
precursors have been reported. Preparing 
for earthquakes means being always ready 
for the unexpected, which is a long-term 
proposition. 
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Although we are still 
learning what value can 
be derived from short-
term forecasts, the value 
of long-term forecasts 
for ensuring seismic 
safety is indisputable.
